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Abstract
This paper presents Thinkey, an efficient, secure, in-
finitely scalable and decentralized blockchain architec-
ture. It ensures system correctness and liveness by a
multi-layer structure. In particular, the system is based on
a double-chain architecture and uses a multi-layer consen-
sus protocol to guarantee consistency. Thinkey also uses
a novel account model which is based on Actor Model
to support the complex logic in the multi-chain structure.
Experiment results show that the proposed Thinkey archi-
tecture can achieve higher throughput as the number of
nodes increases.
1 Introduction
While the centralized Internet has promoted the rapid de-
velopment of cyber systems and their communications,
it also introduces many problems such as data owner-
ship, information opaqueness, monopoly and lack of trust.
Today, people are increasingly looking forward to trust-
worthy public computing infrastructures, in which an en-
tity’s behavior is always carried out in an expected way.
Such trustworthy infrastructures usually contain trustwor-
thy hardware, systems, and software.
In such a context, a single entity can no longer meet
people’s need for trust. People started to create trustwor-
thy distributed computing platforms which involve par-
ticipation from individual computing nodes (e.g., Bitcoin
[19]) but are not controlled by any committee or individ-
ual. These computing nodes should be in the hands of di-
verse parties or individual clients running a program that
is completely open-source with specifications open to ev-
eryone.
Blockchain is a trusted distributed computing platform
that fulfills the above requirements. Recently, studies
on blockchain related technologies are gaining popular-
ity and attracting attention from researchers in different
fields, such as cryptography, distributed system, network,
economy, and social science. This field was originated
from the work of Nakamoto [19], who proposed the first
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blockchain protocol as Bitcoin, and extended a lot of re-
search directions, including consensus, privacy comput-
ing, mechanism design, network and data storage. It also
found numerous applications in many areas, such as fi-
nancial systems, supply chains, health cares.
As a distributed platform that is composed of thou-
sands of individual computing nodes without any cen-
tral controller, blockchain systems are facing many chal-
lenges. One of the most critical challenges is to achieve
permissionless consensus among the distributed comput-
ing nodes in an efficient and scalable way. This is par-
ticularly true in the scenario where the system continu-
ously growswith an increasing amount of clients and data,
which requires (1) high efficiency in terms of handling
multiple concurrent transactions in parallel, and (2) scal-
ability in terms of maintaining high efficiency when the
system scales up. However, the performance of current
blockchain platforms is still far away from being satisfac-
tory. For example, the average transaction rates in Bit-
coin have been limited to below 10 transactions per sec-
ond (Tx/s). More importantly, when the processing limit
is reached, the blockchain platformsmay have to continue
by discarding some of their clients’ transactions, which
will undermine the systems’ availability and significantly
increase the usage costs.
To improve the system efficiency and scalability to sup-
port large-scale transactions (e.g., smart contract transac-
tions), the sharding approach has been proposed as a fea-
sible solution, which aims to divide transactions into mul-
tiple packages that can be handled in parallel by different
committees of participating nodes [4]. The idea of net-
work and transaction sharding was first proposed in Elas-
tico [17] and promoted by Zilliqa [24], OmniLedger [15],
Chainspace [1] and RapidChain [27]. However, current
sharding solutions are still at their early stage and cannot
well handle the following two main challenges: (1) how
to split the state into multiple shards and support cross-
shard transactions efficiently; and (2) how to select nodes
to ensure the trustworthiness of each committee.
1.1 Overview of Thinkey
In order to solve the challenges discussed above, we have
proposed and implemented Thinkey, a novel blockchain
infrastructure that is fully decentralized, trusted and scal-
able. In particular, our structure is based on a double-
chain architecture consisting of a root chain and transac-
tion chains. The workloads are partitioned and handled
by parallel transaction chains. The root chain acts as the
leader and coordinator of the entire system. In the trans-
action chain, we package the transactions into blocks and
use the Byzantine consensus algorithm to reach consen-
sus. The structure has great flexibility and scalability and
can be dynamically adjusted so that each chain does not
become a performance bottleneck of the entire system. In
addition, as the number of chains increases, the through-
put of the entire system increases linearly without gener-
ating too many redundant messages.
In addition, to efficiently handle cross-chain transac-
tions, we propose a message-driven protocol based on Ac-
tor Model [10] in this work. In particular, as the state of
the entire network is partitioned by chains, and each chain
is responsible for its own piece, a transaction involving
multiple chains will appear with high probability as the
number of chains increases. As a result, it requires effi-
cient solutions to handle cross-chain transactions. In this
work, we apply the Actor Model to our system, which al-
lows implementing complex logic in an asynchronous and
lock-free manner to keep chains concurrent and fully uti-
lized. In this model, each account represents an actor. We
decouple a transaction which involves a set of accounts
into multiple steps by messages. Each message will be
sent to a unique recipient and will be received and exe-
cuted by the corresponding chain. Each chain is incen-
tivized to handle messages to ensure the atomicity even-
tually.
Our Contribution. Particularly, this paper mainly makes
the following contributions.
1. A four-layer encapsulation system blockchain frame-
work has been proposed and implemented. In par-
ticular, the proposed layered architecture enables the
abstraction and separation of diverse system func-
tionalities and allows each layer to focus on its own
functionality. The design of the proposed blockchain
framework strengthens the blockchain system’s com-
patibility and extensibility, providing a new way for
blockchain framework’s development.
2. A double-layer chain practical architecture that par-
titions transactions and states into parallel chains is
proposed. The structure has great flexibility and scal-
ability and can be dynamically adjusted, such that
each chain does not become a performance bottle-
neck of the entire system.
3. A newmodel of accounts in the multi-chain structure
is proposed to process cross-chain transactions in an
efficient and scalable way.
1.2 Related Work
The blockchain technology has been successfully proved
by Bitcoin [19] and Ethereum [26] through several years
of operations, and shows great potential to be applied in
various applications. However, the performance and scal-
ability issues remain as the main obstacles that hinder the
rapid development of blockchain systems. Researchers
from different domains are conducting various research
projects to improve blockchain performances and scala-
bility. For example, Bitcoin-NG [6] scales Bitcoin with-
out changing the consensus protocol. It uses the same
consensus protocol to elect a leader and commits Byz-
Coin [14] extends Bitcoin-NG to achieve high transaction
throughput through a variant of PBFT [3]. Thunderella
[21] has designed two chains to quickly confirm in op-
timistic situations. By replacing the proof-of-work with
the proof-of-state, the committee can be chosen based on
their stakes [7, 5]. Conflux [16] uses the structure of the
DAG to generate blocks at the same time. However, these
algorithms still require all nodes to validate and process
all transactions.
Elastico [17] was the first candidate for a secure shard-
ing protocol for permissionless blockchain, where nodes
are assigned to committees through proof-of-work and
each committee is responsible for managing a subset of
transactions (shard) consistently through PBFT [3]. A fi-
nal committee collates sets of transactions received from
committees into a final block and then broadcasts it. In
order to meet the performance, the size of its commit-
tee needs to be small, resulting in a high probability of
failure. Zilliqa [24] has improved the election proto-
col and consensus protocol for improved security. Om-
niLedger [15] introduces a cross-shard commit proto-
col that atomically handles transactions affecting multiple
shards. Chainspace [1] improved its solution so that there
are no clients involvement and support for smart contracts.
A recent study RapidChain [27] further optimizes these
sharding protocols. It is resilient to Byzantine faults from
up to a 1/4 fraction.
2 Blockchain: A New Generation of Com-
puting
Blockchain is a trusted distributed computing platform
that can act as a shared computational resource. Clients
can view this platform as a new generation of computing
facilities, to which they can send any requests (i.e., trans-
actions) to it. When the platform receives a request, it
checks the legality of the request first, runs the request on
some nodes, and returns the results to the client. Through
this process, data and messages are transmitted on the
platform to manage computing nodes and resources in a
distributed way. In particular, a valid blockchain design
should have the following properties. (a) Safety: the result
is correct. (b) Liveness: each valid request is processed
within some fixed (small) time duration. Here we assume
that the platform has a unified trusted interface that allows
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clients to send requests and receive results. In addition, a
consensus protocol is also required to ensure that contents
running on different computing nodes are identical. 1
A close model is the classical state machine replica-
tion (SMR) [22, 3]. However, different from the SMR
model, which is under the permissioned settings [20], the
blockchain platform allows any node to join without get-
ting permissions from an authority, which is called per-
missionless. In the permissionless context, the set of
nodes is untrustworthy, which introduces a challenging
issue as that an attacker can trivially mount a “Sybil at-
tack”. In a Sybil attack, the attacker simply spawns lots
of computing nodes and can thus easily ensure that it con-
trols a majority of the computing nodes to achieve con-
sensus. To prevent Sybil attacks, a common method is to
use the proof-of-work (POW) [19] or the proof-of-stake
(POS) [13].
2.1 System Model
In this section, we discuss the blockchain model proposed
in this work in details. Formally, we specify the proposed
blockchain model by a 4-tuple Ω = (N ,A ,C ,F ). Here,
N is the set of all nodes in the system, A is the set of
requests, C is the consensus protocol and F is the set
of all possible behavior errors (or failures) of the system.
This model proceeds for infinite rounds. In each round t,
the set of available nodes and the set of requests are given.
We use Nt ⊆ N and At ⊆ A to denote the current sets
of available nodes and requests, respectively. The goal is
to generate a consistent log for each node in Nt to process
the set of requests At .
For each round t, we use Tt to denote the duration of
round t and dt,i to denote the confirmation time of request
i∈At . Then we have Tt =maxi∈At dt,i and average confir-
mation time dt = ∑i∈At dt,i/|At |. We define the through-
put of round t as the number of requests processed per
second, which is equal to
|At |
Tt
. Furthermore, to implement
the consensus protocol C in the proposed blockchain in-
frastructure, we introduce “log”, a combination of times-
tamps, to define a series of an ordered way (see Section
2.2 for more details). For any two given nodes, they will
run the same request and reach the same state if and only
if they have the same log.
2.2 System Design Goals
2.2.1 The Consensus
The consensus protocol C is the core of the distributed
computing platform. A consensus protocol refers to an
algorithm for a set of interactive Turing Machine (also
called nodes) to interact with other nodes. We start with
an interactive Turing MachineM and a set of requests A .
1We call the platform a trusted computing platform if it satisfies
safety and liveness even if it is centralized. But currently, any single
entity cannot satisfy these two properties, so we need a distributed sys-
tem. The consensus protocol can ensure that the distributed systems can
satisfy these two properties.
As discussed above, a log b for M is a combination of
timestamps to define a series of ordered way. Usually,
these requests are arranged in a linear, ordered way. It can
also be arranged in parallel, even in the form of directed
acyclic graphs (DAG). Since every directed acyclic graph
has a topological ordering, we assume that the order of the
log is linear. Formally, we have
b= {(pi1, t1),(pi2, t2), . . . ,(pir, tr), . . .}
where pi denotes requests of A , and t denotes times in
R≥0. A timed execution of a machine B = (M,b) is de-
fined to be a sequence
α = s0,(pi1, t1),s1,(pi2, t2), . . . ,(pir, tr),sr, . . .
where the s represents states of the machine M and s0 is
the initial state. We require that the sequence of the suc-
cessive times tr in α be nondecreasing. In the consensus
protocol C , each node maintains a local linear log that
satisfies the following conditions.
• Consistency: at any point in the execution, all honest
nodes have consistent logs, i.e., either their logs are
identical, or one node’s log is a prefix of the other’s.
• Synchronism: whenever a node sees some requests
in its log, the same request will appear in every other
node’s log within some fixed (small) amount of time.
The goal of the system is to generate a consistent log of
each node in Nt to process the set of requests At .
2.2.2 Reliability and Security
Failures and attacks can occur in many systems, especially
in distributed systems consisting of heterogeneous indi-
vidual computing nodes. To analyze the reliability and
security of a system, it is crucial to correctly model fail-
ures and attacks faced by the system. We useF to specify
possible failures of nodes and the network, as well as the
attack model.
The analysis of reliability is based on the assumption
of the failure set F . With a regular system setting, it
should ensure that the system can achieve the desired per-
formance with negligible probability of system failures.
When malicious attacks exist, system security may be
under risk. We aim to design our system against typical
attacks, such as denial-of-service attacks, Sybil attacks,
and Byzantine behavior of nodes.
2.2.3 The Scalability
Throughput is an important system performance metric,
which represents the system ability to handle requests.
However, this indicator itself is not adequate. When the
system reaches its processing limit, it has to discard ex-
cess requests requested by clients, making the system
much less usable. Therefore, we need to have another
performance metric to evaluate the system limit, which is
scalability.
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The term scalability is often found in blockchain lit-
erature to indicate that the system throughput can mono-
tonically increase when the number of computing nodes
increases in the system. This definition is not accurate
and makes it difficult to evaluate and compare different
blockchain systems. In addition, the scalability is often
multifaceted, which can represent (1) load scalability, the
ability for a system to accommodate heavier or lighter
loads, (2) functional scalability , the ability to enhance
the system’s capabilities by adding new functions, and (3)
generation scalability, the ability to scale up by using new
generations of components.
In this paper, we present a framework for analyzing
the scalability of blockchain systems, which is somewhat
similar to that of distributed systems [12]. Given a con-
figuration C for the system, we use FC to evaluate the per-
formance and cost of the system by
FC = F(T,S,Q) =
T ·Q
S
(2.1)
where T and Q denote the throughput and the quality of
the service (QoS) of the system respectively. S denotes the
system overall costs, including the node costs, network
bandwidth costs and so on. For a blockchain, its QoS Q
is mainly determined by the average confirmation time d
and the target confirmation time dˆ. In order to normalize
the QoS to (0,1) interval, we set Q= dˆ
d+dˆ
. Then we have
Q= 0 when d→ ∞ and Q= 1 when d→ 0.
Given an initial configuration C, we can scale up the
configuration of the system to Ck by a scaling factor k.
A policy σ specifies how to scale up the configuration.
For example, when the initial configurationC has n nodes,
and the policy σ scales up the number of nodes by k, the
number of nodes in configurationCk is equal to k ·n. Then,
we can quantitatively calculate the scalability as
ψσ (k) =
FCk
FC
(2.2)
If ψσ (k) equals to 1 or monotonically increases as k in-
creases, we say the system has perfect scalability under
the policy σ .
2.2.4 The Speedup
Recall from Section 2.2.3 that the scalability of a system
is based on scale-up policy σ . There are two ways to im-
prove system performance. One is by increasing the per-
formance of each node, and the other is by increasing the
number of nodes. Similar to Amdahl’s Law [2, 11] which
is a formula to compute the theoretical speedup for dis-
tributed systems, we define the speedup for blockchain
systems. Suppose that we use k times the budget to build
the platform, part to improve the performance of each
node, and part to increase the number of nodes. Here we
assume that all the nodes are identical. We use r times
the budget to improve node performance, which can be
increased by f (r) times. The function f (r) can be any
arbitrary functions. Because of hardware limitations, usu-
ally we set f (r) =
√
r or logr. Then the number of nodes
can be expanded by k
r
times. For the request set A , as-
sume that the proportional p part can be processed in par-
allel, while the remaining 1− p parts can only be serial-
ized (e.g., p= 0 in Bitcoin). Then the speedup ratio of the
entire system can be expressed as:
Speedup(p,k,r) =
1
1−p
f (r)
+ p·r
f (r)·k
(2.3)
and the metric ψσ (k) can be approximated as
ψσ (k)≈ Speedup(p,k,r)/k.
As shown in Figure 1, a larger p value leads to a higher
speedup, which agrees with our intuition. The results in-
spire us to view the entire system’s performance rather
than focusing on node efficiencies. In particular, the de-
sign of the system should focus on the support of more
parallelism through architectural and protocol design.
Besides, there are also some optimizations that can im-
prove the performance and scalability of a blockchain sys-
tem. For example, use DAG instead of the linear log and
use POS protocol instead of the POW protocol.
3 The Architecture of Thinkey
In this section, we focus on the design of a blockchain
infrastructure with high scalability without weakening re-
liability and security.
3.1 A Four-layer Encapsulation System
Structure
Based on the above requirements, we introduce the high-
level structure of Thinkey, which is a four-layer structure
to support more parallel executions. As shown in Fig-
ure 2, the structure has four layers. The first layer is the
task layer, which is mainly responsible for dividing re-
quests and nodes and assigning different requests to spe-
cific committees for processing. The second layer is the
process layer, which needs to process the assigned re-
quests and produce logs. The third layer is the data layer,
where the log and request data generated by each commit-
tee need to be aggregated according to a specific coding
method to form a unified log. The fourth layer is the net-
work layer, which is the basic layer to establish connec-
tions between nodes and provide communication. Next,
we will discuss each layer in details.
Task layer. All requests are first sent to the task layer,
where they will be divided and assigned to different com-
mittees for parallel processing. As not all requests can be
processed in parallel, they need to be divided according to
their types. In addition, all active nodes are registered at
the task layer. These nodes are divided into committees
and allocated to process different requests in a random
way. We need to ensure that each committee is trusted,
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Figure 1: Speedupwith (a) k= 16, f (r) =
√
r, (b) k= 16, f (r)= logr, (c) k= 256, f (r) =
√
r and (d) k= 256, f (r)= logr.
Figure 2: The high-level structure of Thinkey overview.
1. Task layer: assign requests to specific processing com-
mittees. 2. Process layer: process requests and generates
logs. 3. Data layer: synchronize the logs of committees
to achieve consistency. 4. Network layer: provides com-
munication between nodes.
i.e., the proportion of malicious nodes inside each com-
mittee will not exceed a certain threshold set by the sys-
tem.
Process layer. The process layer has a set of commit-
tees, where each committee contains a set of nodes. When
a committee receives a given request, it needs to process
the request, reach consensus, and generate a log. As each
committee is guaranteed to be trustful at the task layer,
this layer only needs to consider how to reach consensus
in a committee as soon as possible.
Data layer. The goal of the system is that each node
produces a consistent log. Therefore, an aggregation al-
gorithm is required to integrate all the logs generated by
the nodes in a committee to reach a unified log. An encod-
ing method is also required to reduce the storage of each
node. In addition, as nodes should join and leave different
committees from time to time, it is essential to have the
corresponding data from the data layer be synchronized.
Network layer. This layer provides the foundation of
the entire system by enabling communications among dif-
ferent computing nodes. At the same time, within the net-
work layer, we can build a multi-layer network and estab-
lish a layer of consensus network for each committee.
As a summary, in our architecture, a request generated
by a client first passes through the task layer. After the
Figure 3: The basic double-layer architecture of Thinkey.
The root chain records metadata and digests of comfirmed
blocks of each transaction chain, produces random seeds
and records the election results.
classification at the task layer, the request is sent to a com-
mittee at the process layer. The committee processes the
requests and sends the results and logs to the data layer.
The data layer aggregates all the logs and returns the re-
sults back to the client.
3.2 A Double-layer Chain Architecture
From an implementation perspective, our chain structure
is based on a double-layer chain architecture consisting of
a root chain and transaction chains. Each (root or transac-
tion) chain is an individual blockchain with its own state.
As illustrated in Figure 3, transaction chains (i.e., the hor-
izontal chains) are anchored to the root chain (the vertical
chain).
The root chain acts as the leader and coordinator of the
entire system. In particular, it serves as an entry point and
source of trust to the transaction chains; records metadata
and digests of confirmed blocks of each transaction chain;
produces random seeds used in committee elections (of all
chains); and records the election results.
The workload of the system is shared by the transac-
tion chains. The cross-chain operations are handled using
a message-driven protocol based on the actor model (see
Section 5).
All nodes in the system maintain the state of the root
chain. By updating and verifying blocks of the root chain,
a node can verify (any part of) a block of a transaction
chain that has been included in the root chain. This struc-
ture is advantageous in the following aspects.
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Figure 4: Sharding for root chain and transaction chain in
the double-chain architecture of Thinkey
• To join the system, a node only need to obtain the
current state of the root chain either from a trusted
source or by reconstructing from the genesis block,
which is a small workload compared to synchroniz-
ing all the data of the entire system.
• The consensus of each (root or transaction) chain is
carried out independently and in parallel, dramati-
cally reducing the usage of network and processing
power.
• The root chain can serve as a coordinator of the sys-
tem, which provides synchrony across transaction
chains and allows system topology to be dynamic.
• A node can verify a transaction initiated from an-
other transaction chain, using the digest in the root
chain and a Merkle proof. Therefore, a block pro-
ducer of a transaction chain does not need any in-
formation from other transaction chains to process
inter-chain transactions.
Furthermore, the root chain and transactions chains can
perform deeper sharding (see Figure 4). Here, the root
chain and transaction chains define rules and make a bal-
anced distribution of transactions to its sub-chains. Then
it only needs to process a small number of transactions
and record the digest of each sub-chain.
To sum up, such a layered fragmentation structure has
great flexibility and scalability and can be dynamically ad-
justed, so that each chain does not become a performance
bottleneck of the entire network. In addition, as the num-
ber of chains increases, the throughput of the entire sys-
tem increases linearly without generating too many redun-
dant messages.
4 Our Protocol
In this section, we present our protocol in more details. In
the basic double-layer architecture (see Figure 3), let CR
denote the root chain and let C1,C2, . . . ,Cn denote the n
transaction chains.
4.1 Committee Selection
To resist the Sybil attack against the permissionless sys-
tem, we use a proof-of-stake based election algorithm.
The following security properties are desirable for the se-
lection algorithm.
• Assuming δ0 honest majority (of stake) among all
participants, at least δ1-proportion of the committee
members elected in each election are honest except
with negligible probability. Furthermore, the algo-
rithm should be fair in the sense that the probability
of each participant being chosen is (roughly) propor-
tional to the amount of stake committed by the par-
ticipant.
• The committee members should be fluid and unpre-
dictable so that the adversary cannot attack the sys-
tem by corrupting committee members (assuming
corruption takes longer than the life span of a com-
mittee).
In Thinkey, we achieve the above properties through the
following processes. First, before the election, since only
the root chain is listened to by all nodes and the chains are
not synchronized, a transaction chain has to put a signal on
the root chain when it needs to elect the next committee.
The election will use the next seed after the signal shows
up on the root chain.
Next, the election process is managed by the root chain.
In particular, the randomness used in the election is pro-
vided by the random seed generated in the root chain CR.
The committee of the root chain generates a random seed
periodically, which is included in a block of CR. Our cur-
rent implementation generates random seeds using DFIN-
ITY’s random beacon protocol [8], based on BLS thresh-
old signature.
In addition, nodes willing to participate in the consen-
sus need to register on the root chain by sending a spe-
cial type of transaction. The transaction also specifies the
amount of the stake, which will be transferred to a spe-
cific stake account and be frozen until the node quits and
withdraws the stake. These nodes then monitor the elec-
tion signals in the root chain. When a node sees an elec-
tion signal and the next seed, with its secret key, it can
compute whether it is elected to the next committee of the
chain that sent the signal.
Once the committee selection is completed, nodes
elected to a transaction chain will join the network of the
chain and start receiving the blocks of the chain. They also
start to synchronize the state of the transaction chain. The
received blocks and the state can all be verified using the
digests on the root chain. Each node sends an “elected”
transaction containing its public key and a proof that it has
been elected, so that the current committee and the other
elected members are notified.
The elected nodes will set up a small consensus net-
work that will be used for the communication within the
committee. Having a dedicated network reduces the delay
and bandwidth consumption of both point-to-point com-
munications and broadcasts among committee members.
On the other hand, if not set up properly, the network may
be less stable and more vulnerable to attacks. It needs to
6
Figure 5: Overview of committee consensus.
be ensured that the network topology is robust and node
information is exchanged securely using encryption.
By the time the next epoch begins, the new commit-
tee should have generated the keys for threshold signature
(the public key should have been written to a block); have
synchronized and updated the current state of the chain;
and have established connections in the new consensus
network.
4.2 Consensus in Committees
We assume a partially synchronous communicationmodel
within the committee, for which there exist efficient
Byzantine-fault-tolerant algorithms. Here we present a
variant of PBFT tailored for this setting.
The execution of a node can be divided into rounds.
Each round consists of three stages: proposal, prepara-
tion, and confirmation (see Figure 5). The state transitions
are event-driven. In order to preserve system liveness in
the presence of network failures or malicious attacks, a
timeout may be triggered by the local clock.
1. Proposal stage: The leader of the committee broad-
casts the proposed block to other committee mem-
bers.
2. Preparation stage: Upon receiving the proposed
block, each committee member broadcasts a mes-
sage containing its signature of the block. If a
timeout is triggered before the proposed block is
received, the committee member signs and broad-
casts a special message (which indicates the leader
is faulty) to other committee members.
3. Confirmation stage: At the end of the preparation
stage, each committee member signs and broadcasts
a package of the signatures received in the prepara-
tion stage. Signature aggregation can be used to sig-
nificantly reduce the size of messages in the confir-
mation stage.
Based on the messages received in the confirmation stage,
each committee member can decide whether agreement
on the block has been reached, and broadcasts the agreed
block or an empty block together with a proof of its deci-
sion.
Malicious nodes punishment. In the case when an ex-
plicitly misbehaving node is detected (e.g., a node that
sends different messages to different nodes at the same
stage), the round will abort by outputting an empty block.
However, the misbehaving node will be economically
punished by a large amount, making such attacks unsus-
tainable.
Optimization. In the case when the number of signa-
tures received at the preparation stage implies that most
honest committee members have received the same pro-
posed block, a committee member may reach an “early
consensus”: the member can output the block before the
confirmation stage with the signatures being the proof
of agreement (of a different form compared to a regular
agreement). Note that the node still needs to participate in
the confirmation stage.
4.3 Cross-Chain Message and Verification
In a multi-chain system, a cross-chain operation is un-
avoidable. Each chain needs to process some messages
which are generated by other chains. There are two kinds
of cross chain messages in our system. The first one is the
message mi from Ci to CR which contains the digest of a
block of Ci. The message mi is for the final confirmation
of the block of Ci and there is only one such message for
each block. The second one is the the outer relay message
mi, j from Ci to C j (see Section 5 for more details). Before
mi, j is sent to C j, it is recorded on the block of Ci.
Before the deal with these messages, we should verify
them first. There are two approaches to verify a message
generated by a chain: (1) verify the signature; (2) verify
the message hash. Both approaches are useful, depending
on the type of messages. For the message mi from Ci
to CR, it attaches a signature of the committee members
of Ci that can be used to verify authenticity. Since the
committee member of Ci is recorded in CR, each node in
CR has the public keys of current committee members of
Ci and can verify the signature of mi.
For the message mi, j from Ci to C j, it comes with proof
pii, j that can be proved. Before mi, j is sent to C j, it is
recorded on the block of Ci. On the block of Ci, there is a
Merkel tree Ti for all outer relay messages. The proof pii, j
refers to the hash values of all sibling nodes on the path
from the Merkle tree root to its entry. The root hash of
Ti is included in the digest of Ci. Since the digest of the
block of Ci is recorded in the root chain CR, and each node
in C j is also a node in CR, each node in C j can obtain the
root hash of Ti and verifies mi, j by the proof pii, j.
The reason for not using the signature to verify mi, j is
to prevent the situation where the committee members of
Ci are not completely reliable. The message generated by
this block will only take effect if its block is finally con-
firmed on C. However, for a cross-shard message of the
same transaction chain Ci (see Figure 4), its verification
can be faster, just wait until the digest is recorded on its
transaction chain Ci, not the root chain C.
4.4 Network Layer
The decentralized nature of P2P networks makes them
an ideal solution for the underlying communications of
blockchain systems. As the network part often becomes
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Figure 6: Data redundancy.
the bottleneck of high throughput blockchains, P2P tech-
nology has attracted more and more attention as a poten-
tial technology for blockchain networks. In blockchain,
as a large number of data broadcasting operations are re-
quired, efficiency and redundancy are the key issues that
all blockchain P2P network design must pay attention to.
Conventional blockchain P2P networks (such as Bit-
coin and Ethereum) are often based on unstructured de-
sign ideas. When broadcasting, a partial-broadcasting
mechanism is adapted to alleviate the message redun-
dancy problem. For example, when broadcasting a large
message M, node P randomly selects some nodes in its
connection list for full transmission. For the remaining
nodes (e.g., Q), only the profile ofM (e.g., the hash ofM)
is transmitted. Only when Q needs the message M and
cannot find it in its own database, it will pull the message
from P. In the experiment part, we have proved through
comparison of several sets of parameters that the design
can significantly reduce the redundancy of message trans-
missions.
However, this solution still has its limitations. For ex-
ample, the requirements for higher throughput and point-
to-point transmission will become inadequate under a
structured P2P network. In such cases, the structured net-
work (such as DHT) is a solution that can be used for fur-
ther optimization. In a structured P2P network, nodes fol-
low some rules during the networking phase (e.g., Chord
[23], Kademlia [18]). This provides directional guidance
for data transfer and can greatly reduce the number of use-
less transfers. However, in blockchain, especially in pub-
lic chain projects, there are assumptions that nodes can
join and exit arbitrarily. Networks with frequent changes
will incur huge costs for structure maintenance. There-
fore, one of the challenges in adopting structured P2P
networks is to deal with the instability and uncertainty of
complex networks. In Thinkey, we use a combination of
structured + unstructured methods. Some scenarios (such
as point-to-point transmission) use a structured P2P net-
work approach to reduce redundancy, and to improve ef-
ficiency, while having an unstructured transmission as a
guarantee of stability.
Figure 6 shows the impact of the partial-broadcasting
mechanism in reducing message redundancy. We assume
that each node is randomly connected to 10 nodes. The
horizontal axis shows the number of complete informa-
tion received by each node when the node sends complete
information to all, 8, 4, 2, and 1 neighbors. For each case,
we count the redundancy of the network when it expands
from 100 nodes to 1000 nodes. It can be seen that (1) the
system redundancy can be significantly reduced when the
number of full message broadcast decreases. When a node
broadcasts a complete message to only one neighbor, each
node will only receive the same complete information less
than twice. (2) When the number of neighbors connected
to each node is constant, the amount of redundancy has
nothing to do with the size of the network.
5 A New Model of Account in the Multi-
Chain Structure
For the multi-chain system, the current account models
(e.g., UTXO or Ethereum account) for the single-chain
system have not adapted to meet the new realities, espe-
cially when dealing with a large number of cross-chain
operations. Based on the theoretical of Actor Model [10],
we propose a new account model, which allows us to im-
plement complex logic on the multi-chain system in an
asynchronous and lock-free manner. In this model, we de-
couple a transaction which involves a set of accounts into
multiple steps in the form of messages. Each message is
received by a unique recipient and will be executed by the
corresponding chain. All messages will be executed and
will eventually achieve the transaction correctly.
5.1 Actor Model
Actor Model was introduceted by Hewitt et al. [10] in
1973, which is a conceptual model to deal with concur-
rent computation. The model has been used both as a
framework to understand concurrency and as the theoreti-
cal basis for several practical implementations of concur-
rent systems. For example, the electronic mail system,
web services and objects with locks in Java. See [9] for
more details.
An actor is the universal primitives of concurrent digi-
tal computation. When receiving a message, the actor can
concurrently:
1. send a finite number of messages to other actors;
2. create a finite number of new actors;
3. designate the behavior to be used when the next mes-
sage is received.
There is no assumed sequence to the above actions and
they could be carried out in parallel. Each actor has a
8
Figure 7: Actor Model
mailbox to receive messages from other actors (see Figure
7). Messages are sent asynchronously to an actor and each
actor processes messages sequentially with no restriction
on message arrival order. Multiple actors can run at the
same time. It is worth noting that actors are completely
isolated from each other and they will never share mem-
ory. Each actor maintains a private state that can never be
changed directly by another actor.
5.2 Thinkey Account
We adopt Actor Model as the basic framework for our ac-
count model. In Thinkey, the account structure mainly
contains the following field pieces of information:
Address: The unique identifier of the blockchain ac-
count.
Balance: The account’s current balance.
Nonce: A scalar value equal to the number of externally
messages sent from this address.
Code: The programmatic logic for processing mes-
sages.
Storage: The internal state of the account which can be
empty.
Each account is controlled by a private key. In the code,
the account defines its ownmethods for the messages it re-
ceived. It is allowed to send a message to other accounts,
to create a new account and to modify the internal state.
For some specfic messages, there are general processing
methods which are identical for each account (e.g., “tran”
and “add” in Section 5.4). Each account also can cus-
tomize the methods for other messages.
There are two types of message: external message and
relay message. The external message is created by an ac-
count who signs it with its private key. The relay mes-
sage is produced by an account who executes the send
command in the process of execution, which is somewhat
similar to the message in Ethereum. The biggest differ-
ence is that the relay message execution is asynchronous
in our model and synchronous in Ethereum. Thus these
messages in our model support cross-chain propagation.
A message in Thinkey mainly contains the following field
pieces of information:
From: The address of the messages’ sender.
To: The address of the recipient of the message.
Figure 8: An example of processing for the accounts in
our model
Nonce: A scalar value equal to the number of external
messages sent by the sender or, for relay messages,
nil.
Input: A tuple specifying the input data of the message
call.
Verification data: A signature identifying the sender for
externally message, or a proof for the relay mes-
sage.
For an external message, it can be verified by the signature
and nonce. For a relay message, it can be verified by the
proof (see Section ).
5.3 Thinkey Block
For each block on a chain C, there is three status of a
message on the block.
1. Input messages. These messages are currently not
confirmed and the recipients of them are in C. They
can be externalmessages or relay messages produced
by other chains.
2. Inter relay messages. These are the messages gen-
erated during the execution of the entire block, and
their receivers are on the same chain C. Thus they
are confirmed on the block.
3. Outer relay messages. These are the messages gen-
erated during the execution of the entire block, and
their receivers are on other chains. These messages
will be confirmed by other chains.
We describe an example shown in Figure 8. There are
three accounts 1,2,3 on the chain C and three accounts
4,5,6 on other chains. In particular, there are three input
messages (i.e., m1,m2,m3), received by the accounts 1,2,
and 3 respectively.
For each account i, we use σi to denote the order in
which the messages are processed and the new messages
are generated. Then, we have
σ1 = (m1 :m4 | m8 | m6 : m9)
σ2 = (m2 :m5,m6 | m4 : m7,m10)
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Figure 9: The direct graph Gσ of the processing message
order σ = (σ1,σ2,σ3)
σ3 = (m5 : m11 | m3 :m8 | m7)
Thus σ1 indicates that account 1 processes messagem1,
m8 and m6 in order. An inter relay message m4 is gen-
erated by excuting m1 and an outer relay message m9 is
generated by excuting m6. Then we have inter relay mes-
sages set {m4,m5, . . . ,m8} and outer relay messages set
{m9,m10,m11}.
On receiving a block proposed by a leader, a committee
member needs to verify the block to defend against a ma-
licious leader. In our system, a node verifies three parts:
1. Validity of each input message, i.e., {m1,m2,m3}.
2. Validity of the proceesing for each account,
i.e., {σ1,σ2,σ3}. They can be verified independently
and in parallel.
3. Validity the processing message order, i.e., the order
σ = (σ1,σ2,σ3).
To verify the processing message order σ , we build a di-
rect graph Gσ below. For two events e1, and e2, the ex-
pression of e1 → e2 indicates that the time of e1 precedes
the time of e2 in the frame of reference for every rela-
tivistic observer. Let −→mi denote the event that an account
receives a message mi, and
←−mi denote the event that an
account sends a message mi. Then we have
←−mi → −→mi.
For each σi, for example i= 1, we have
−→m1 →−→m8 →−→m6.
Based on these relationships from σ , we can build a di-
rected graph Gσ (see Figure 9).
Theorem 1. The processing message order σ =
(σ1,σ2,σ3) is valid if and only if the dircet graph Gσ does
not have a circle.
5.4 A Payment Application
In this section, we present a payment process, such as Bit-
coin, as an example of the Thinkey’s potential applica-
tions. We define an account with a local state as balance
(see below). There are two kinds of messages: “tran”
and “add”, which represent withdraw and deposit respec-
tively. A simplified sample code written in the Elixir lan-
guage [25] that describe the payment process is shown in
Algorithm 1. As shown in Figure 10, we use an exam-
Algorithm 1 The account module for payment applica-
tion
1: balance
2: while receive message m do
3: if m= {: tran, address, bill} then
4: if balance≥ bill then
5: balance = balance− bill
6: send (address,{: add, bill})
7: end if
8: else if m= {: add, bill} then
9: balance = balance+ bill
10: end if
11: end while
ple to demonstrate the process. Suppose there are three
accounts Alice, Bob, and Charlie with balance 20,5,10
respectively. There are two messages m1 and m3, which
are signed by Alice and Bob respectively. Message m1 is
a transfer with 10 from Alice to Bob and message m3 is
a transfer with 10 from Bob to Charlie. Then as we set
on the code, message m1 is processed on Alice’s chain as
follows.
1. An unconfirmed message m1 is picked up by the
committee members in Alice’s chain if the signa-
ture is validated when the members construct a new
block.
2. When the balance of Alice is not less than the trans-
fer amount (i.e., satisfies Line 4 in Algorithm 1), and
Alice and Bob belong to the same chain, the com-
mittee members records the message processing pro-
cedure σa = (m1 : m2) on the block. It means that
processing m1 produces m2 (Line 6 in Algorithm 1).
Meanwhile, the message m2 is marked as an inter-
relay message and executed on the block. In this
case, the balance of Alice is deducted by 10 (Line
5 in Algorithm 1) and the balance of Bob is added by
10 (Line 9 in Algorithm 1).
3. When Line 5 in Algorithm is satisfied, and Alice and
Bob are from different chains, σa = (m1 :m2) is also
recorded on the block. Meanwhile, the committee
members mark the m2 as outer relay message on the
block and sendm2 to the destination chain, i.e.,Bob’s
chain. In this case, the withdraw operation for Alice
is executed (Line 5 in Algorithm 1). The outer relay
messagem2 will be excuted in the same way at Bob’s
chain.
4. When the balance of Alice is less than the transfer
amount (i.e., Line 4 in Algorithm 1 is not satisfied),
σ ′a = (m1 :∅) is recorded on the block. In this case,
the balances of Alice and Bob do not change.
For each account i, we use σi to denote the order in
which the messages are processed and the new messages
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Figure 10: A transfer example
are generated. Thus, when these three accounts are on
a same chain, we have σa = (m1 : m2),σb = (m2 | m3 :
m4),σc = (m4) as shown in Figure 10, and record the
message processing procedures σ = (σa,σb,σc) in the
block. Then nodes can get the same state through σ . The
only thing to do is to reach a consensus on σ (block)
because the reception order of messages can affect be-
haviors. For example, the order in which the process-
ing messages m2 and m3 for Bob can be reversed to get
another valid message processing procedures σ ′ = ((m1 :
m2),(m3 | m2),∅). When there three accounts are on dif-
ferent chains, the message processing procedures σa, σb
and σc are recorded on corresponding chains respectively,
which complete these two transfers.
We remark that the transfer of balance is confirmed at
the first stage. As long as the message m1 is included in
the block during the first phase, Bob can be certain that
the transfer has been confirmed. Bob can just wait for the
settlement. And the value being transferred can be used.
Through this process, cross-chain transfers can achieve
the same speed of confirmation as intra-chain transfers.
5.5 CryptoKitties Application
In the previous section, we present a payment application.
Moreover, our model can support any complex logic. We
take CryptoKitties as another example, which is a popular
application in Ethereum and attracts a lot of people. Cryp-
toKitties is an electronic pet game based on the Ethereum
smart contract. In the game, players can buy and sell.
However, the kitty auctions can block the Ethereum net-
work, which undermines the system’s availability and sig-
nificantly increases the usage costs. In our account model,
we propose a multi-chain solution to solve network con-
gestions.
In particular, our program involves three types of ac-
counts: a Collector, multiple Auctioneers, and a Recorder
as shown in Figure 11. The Collector is responsible for
collecting all auction requests from a seller. The Auction-
eers will auction the kitties. And the Recorder is respon-
sible for counting auction results.
Processing is kicked off by an Auctioneer requesting a
kitty from the Collector. When the Auctioneer receives
the kitty, it can auction this kitty and sends the auction re-
sult to the Recorder. Finally, the Recorder lets the Collec-
tor know whether the kitty has been auctioned. The auc-
Figure 11: A multi-chain solution for CryptoKitties
tioneer can be placed on different chains. The workloads
of the auctions can be partitioned in multiple independent
and parallel chains.
It is possible that a single kitty attracts a committee of
people to bid, which is called “single kitty hotspot” issue.
In this case, the auction of the hot kitty can be held by
different auctioneers. The bidder can choose any auction-
eer to bid. Finally, all the auction results will be summa-
rized and sent to the Recorder. According to the rules, the
Recorder selects a bid winner for the hot kitty.
5.6 Optimization and Discussions
We use optimization to reduce the cost of communication
and the storage of accounts. The first optimization aims
to avoid duplicated storage. For some specific messages,
there are general processing methods that are identical for
each account. These public methods are designed by the
system and are not required to be designed by each ac-
count. The second optimization reduces the cost of com-
munication by merging a bunch of messages of the same
type. For example, if there are 10 “add” messages, which
are sent to the same account, they can be combined into
one “add” message.
For the “single account hotspot” issue, where a single
account is involved in a great number of messages, it can
be easily resolved by the co-design of applications at the
upper layer, which is similar to the “single kitty hotspot”
issue as discussed in Section 5.5. The popular accounts
can be placed on multiple chains.
6 System Analysis and Experiment
In this section, we will analyze the security, the perfor-
mance, and complexity of Thinkey.
6.1 Security
Let N be the number of nodes, n be the expected number
of nodes in a committee, m be the number of committees.
The number of malicious nodes is λN. We say a commit-
tee is failedwhen more than ρ of the nodes in the commit-
tee are malicious nodes. Without loss of generality, we set
N = n ·m. Suppose there is a completely random oracle
O : [N]→ [m]. Fix a committee i, let Ai be the event that
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Figure 12: The relationship between TPS and the number
of shards.
the fraction of malicious nodes in the committee i > ρ .
Then for each i ∈ [m], we have
Pr[Ai] =
n
∑
x=ρn+1
(
λN
x
) · ((1−λ )N
n−x
)
(
N
n
) . (6.1)
By union bound, we have
Pr
[∪i∈[m]Ai
]≤ m ·Pr[Ai]. (6.2)
We can ensure that the probability of the event occurring
is negligible for an adequate parameter setting.
6.2 Experiment
In the experiment part, we simulate a blockchain system
including 400 nodes to analyze the performance of our
protocol. Each node works on a single core CPU with 2G
RAM. Our system is implemented using Go.
6.2.1 Scalability
In the first experiment, we analyze the relationship be-
tween the throughput per second (TPS) and the num-
ber of shards in this system. Here, all the accounts in-
volved in the transaction are randomly generated. As
shown in Figure 12, the linear increasing curve shows
that Thinkey achieves our design goal on the scalability
through the proposed sharding scheme. That is, when the
number of chains (shards) increases, the TPS can also in-
crease linearly, instead of stagnation of single-chain sys-
tem (i.e., Bitcoin).
6.2.2 Confirmation Latency
The confirmation latency is completely related to the
block time (i.e., the time interval between two adjacent
Figure 13: The relationship between the block time and
the block size.
Figure 14: The relationship between the epoch time, the
number of shards and the ratio of cross-chain transactions.
blocks). In the second experiment, we analyze the rela-
tionship between the block time and block size (i.e., the
number of messages in the block). As shown in Fig-
ure 13, when the block size is fixed, the distribution of
the block time roughly follows Gaussian distribution with
small fluctuations. In addition, when the block size in-
creases, the block time also increases monotonically. This
result indicates that the TPS cannot be increased directly
by increasing the block size. Comparing the result in the
previous section, the best way to scale out the TPS is to
use the sharding scheme.
6.2.3 Cross-chain Overhead
In a multi-chain system, a cross-chain operation is un-
avoidable. Especially when the number of chains is large,
the ratio of cross-chain transactions (i.e., percentage of
cross-chain transactions among all transactions) will be
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high. In the third experiment, we analyze the relation-
ship between the epoch time and the ratio of cross-chain
transactions. We generate different numbers of shards,
i.e., setting it to 2,4,8,16 and 32. As shown in Figure
14, the epoch time increases when either the number of
shards or the ratio of cross-chain transactions increases.
However, when the number of shards is fixed, the smooth
curve shows that the overhead of the cross-chain transac-
tion is small, which achievers our design goal on handling
cross-chain transactions through a newmodel of accounts.
That is, processing cross-chain transactions in an efficient
and scalable way.
7 Conclusion
We proposed and implemented Thinkey, a distributed
blockchain architecture that enables efficient, secure and
highly scalable transaction handling. We proposed a four-
layer encapsulation system structure and a double-layer
chain architecture. In particular, the four-layer structure
enables the abstraction and separation of diverse system
functionalities and allows each layer to focus on its own
functionality. The double-layer chain architecture can
make the system scale out linearly by partitioning the
workload of the system. Additionally, committee selec-
tion and cross-chain verification are key protocols pro-
posed by our system, ensuring the efficiency and security
of systems. We also proposed a novel account model to
support any complex logic in a multi-chain structure. In
our experiment, we demonstrate that our system delivers
10000+ throughput.
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